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1 It took President Barack Obama six years to fulfill his 2008 campaign promise to make a
“new  beginning”  with  Cuba.  But  in  the  two  years  after  the  December  17,  2014
announcement  that  he  and  Cuban  President  Raúl  Castro  had  agreed  to  normalize
relations,  Obama  moved  fast  to  lock  in  gains  that  would  make  the  new  policy
“irreversible”  (Obama  B.,  2016).  He  did  not  mean  legally irreversible.  Faced  with  a
recalcitrant Congress, Obama had no choice but to use his executive authority to engage
with Cuba. Using that same authority, a president determined to return to the status quo
ante  of  hostility  could  undo  everything  Obama  had  done.  In  the  24  months  from
December  2014  to  January  2017,  the  Obama  administration’s  goal was  to  make  the
opening to Cuba politically irreversible—to demonstrate such unmistakable success, both
diplomatically and commercially, that reversing course would, in the words of Deputy
National Security Adviser Ben Rhodes (2016), “make no sense.” 
2 The opportunities for trade and travel opened up by Obama’s regulatory reforms were
intended to  create  stakeholders—constituencies  with a  self-interest  in  defending and
extending  the  new  policy.  “There’s  already  increased  commercial  activity.  There’s
already increased travel,” Rhodes (2015) explained, nine months into the new policy.
“The U.S. business community, which has traditionally supported the Republican Party,
are enormous advocates for this change. Republicans would have to be going against their
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key stakeholders in places like the Chamber of Commerce if they were to reverse this
process.”
3 Donald Trump began his presidency promising to negotiate a “better deal” from Havana,
or else he would “terminate” the opening to Cuba (Heavey S. and S. Marsh, 2016). But he
faced an impressive array of stakeholders both at home and abroad determined to resist
any backsliding. The result, announced on June 16, 2017, was a policy composed of a few
new economic sanctions tightening the embargo cloaked in fiery rhetoric reminiscent of
the Cold War, but leaving most of Obama’s initiatives untouched. 
 
Demonstrating Success
4  In  the final  two  years  of  Obama’s  presidency,  the  United  States  and  Cuba  made
astonishingly fast diplomatic progress. Washington endorsed Cuba’s participation in the
Seventh Summit of the Americas in Panama in April 2015, and took Cuba off the State
Department’s  list  of  state  sponsors  of  international  terrorism  in  May.  The  two
governments restored full diplomatic relations in July. Obama and Castro met face-to-face
for substantive discussions at the Summit and at the United Nations General Assembly in
September. Then in March 2016, Obama became the first sitting president to visit Cuba
since Calvin Coolidge in 1928. 
5 The two sides established an infrastructure of diplomacy to manage the complex welter
of  issues  between  them.  A  Bilateral  Commission,  meeting  semi-annually,  oversaw
negotiations taking place in some two dozen separate conversations on a wide range of
issues,  including  migration,  human  trafficking,  law  enforcement,  counter-narcotics
cooperation, maritime safety, Coast Guard cooperation, environmental protection, global
health  cooperation,  property  claims,  and  human  rights.  In  just  25  months,  these
negotiations produced 23 bilateral agreements on issues of mutual interest. 
6  In October 2016,  Obama signed Presidential  Policy Directive 43 (White House,  2016),
which explained in detail the rationale for his policy of engagement and tasked various
executive branch agencies with carrying out aspects of it under their jurisdiction. Just
before leaving office, Obama ended the "wet foot/dry foot" migration policy that had
offered Cubans  preferential  immigration status  since  the  1960s  (Hirschfeld  D.  and F.
Robles, 2017).
7 Despite  this  progress,  key  issues  remained  unresolved.  On  Cuba's  agenda  were  the
remnants  of  the  old  U.S.  policy  of  hostility:  the  economic  embargo  (which  Cubans
referred to as el bloqueo—the blockade—because of its extraterritorial scope); the ban on
U.S. tourist travel; “democracy promotion” programs designed to stimulate opposition to
the Cuban government; TV and Radio Martí, U.S. government stations broadcasting to
Cuba; and the U.S. occupation of Guantánamo naval base. On the U.S. ledger were claims
for nationalized property, the return of fugitives from U.S.  justice,  and human rights
inside Cuba. 
8  A  key  element  of  Obama's  strategy  was  to  relax  sanctions  enough to  foster  robust
commercial ties, both to build a business constituency with a stake in continuing the
opening, and to create conditions in Cuba favoring greater economic freedom. As Obama
said in an interview on the anniversary of December 17, "The more that [Cubans] see the
benefits of U.S. investment, the more that U.S. tourist dollars become woven into their
economy, the more that telecommunications is opened up so that Cubans are getting
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information unfettered by censorship, the more you are laying the foundation for the
bigger changes that are coming over time" (Knox O., 2015).
9  To that end, Obama promulgated five packages of changes to the Cuban Assets Control
Regulations (CACR), the rules governing U.S. economic sanctions. The changes punched
successively larger holes in the embargo by licensing a range of financial and commercial
activities, and travel. As bilateral relations warmed, Cuba became a top attraction for U.S.
travelers. The number of non-Cuban American visitors skyrocketed to 161,000 in 2015, up
77%  from  the  previous  year,  and  up  another  74%  to  284,937  in  2016  (EFE,  2017).
Nevertheless,  the  development  of  commercial  relations  lagged.  By  the  end  of  the
administration,  fewer  than  four  dozen  new  U.S.  companies  (besides  agricultural
exporters, who had been doing business with Cuba since 2000) had signed business deals
(U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, 2017). The dearth of agreements was due in part
to the slow pace of decision-making in Cuba’s bureaucracy, but equally important was
political uncertainty in the United States. The U.S. embargo remained inscribed in law
with no prospect of imminent repeal by Congress. When Donald Trump won the 2016
presidential election having threatened to reverse Obama’s policy unless Havana made
unspecified concessions, the business climate chilled.
10  On balance, President Obama’s relaxation of restrictions on trade and travel succeeded in
creating stakeholders ready to resist a return to the politics of hostility. Despite the slow
pace of commercial engagement, U.S. businesses wanted the Cuban market to remain
open, public opinion was firmly behind the policy of engagement, and the foreign policy
establishment regarded Obama’s policy as a boon to national security. 
 
The 2016 U.S. Presidential Campaign
11  Cuba was  not  a  major  issue in  the 2016 U.S.  presidential  campaign,  but  U.S.-Cuban
relations suffered collateral damage. The contrast between the two parties was stark. The
Democratic Platform (Democratic Party Platform Committee, 2016) declared, “In Cuba, we
will build on President Obama’s historic opening and end the travel ban and embargo.”
Hillary Clinton not only supported Obama’s opening to Cuba but she had called for ending
the  embargo  even  before  December  2014  (Clinton  H.,  2014).  The  language  in  the
Republican  Party  Platform  (Republican  National  Convention  Committee  on
Arrangements, 2016) denounced Obama’s Cuba policy as “a shameful accommodation to
the demands of its tyrants,” and offered normal relations only “after [Cuba’s] corrupt
rulers are forced from power and brought to account for their crimes against humanity.”
12  During the campaign, Donald Trump expressed contradictory views about Cuba. At first,
he supported engagement. “Fifty years is enough,” he said in late 2015. “The concept of
opening with Cuba is fine. I think we should have made a stronger deal" (Mazzei P., 2015).
A  few  months  later,  in  March  2016,  he  told  CNN  that  he  would  probably  maintain
diplomatic relations. “I think Cuba has a certain potential and I think it's OK to bring
Cuba into the fold” (Diamond J., 2016).
13  He said little else until September, 2016, when Newsweek broke the story that in 1998,
Trump had secretly explored business  opportunities  in Cuba,  in violation of  the U.S.
embargo, and then tried to disguise the illegal activity as a charitable project (Eichenwald
K.,  2016).  Newsweek’s  exposure  of  Trump’s  hypocrisy  fueled  speculation  that  his
unconsummated 1998 business proposition might cost him Cuban American votes in 2016.
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Shortly thereafter, Trump pivoted, announcing via Twitter: “The people of Cuba have
struggled too long. Will reverse Obama’s executive orders and concessions towards Cuba
until freedoms are restored” (Flores R., 2016). 
14  In the final weeks of the campaign, the Republican ticket focused on energizing its base,
including conservative Cuban Americans. Campaigning in Miami, Trump and Pence both
pledged to roll back Obama’s policy in its entirety. “All of the concessions that Barack
Obama has granted the Castro regime were done with executive order, which means the
next president can reverse them,” Trump said. “And that is what I will do unless the
Castro regime meets our demands. Those demands will include religious and political
freedom for the Cuban people and the freeing of political prisoners” (Diamond J., 2016). 
15  In  the end,  Trump’s  appeal  to  Cuban American voters  had limited success.  He won
between 52 and 54 percent of the Cuban American vote, only a few percentage points
better than Mitt Romney and far below the 2-1 margins Republicans racked up before
2012 (Mazzei P. and N. Nehamas, 2016). Yet Trump believed he owed Cuban Americans a
political  debt.  When Fidel  Castro  died on November  26,  2016,  President-Elect  Trump
condemned the Cuban leader and promised he would work for a free Cuba. “Today, the
world marks the passing of a brutal dictator who oppressed his own people for nearly six
decades,” Trump wrote. “Our administration will do all it can to ensure the Cuban people
can finally begin their journey toward prosperity and liberty.  I  join the many Cuban
Americans who supported me so greatly in the presidential campaign…with the hope of
one day soon seeing a free Cuba” (Trump, 2016). Two days later, he tweeted, “If Cuba is
unwilling to make a better deal for the Cuban people, the Cuban/American people and the
U.S. as a whole, I will terminate deal” (Mazzei P., 2016b). 
16  Cuban  officials  scrupulously  refrained  from  commenting  on  the  U.S.  presidential
campaign while it was under way, simply saying that they hoped whoever won would
carry  out  the  will  of  the  American  people,  who were  overwhelmingly  in  favor  of
normalization (Gómez S. A., 2016). The day after the election, Raúl Castro congratulated
Trump  on  his  victory,  and  the  daily  newspaper  Granma  quoted  the  olive  branch  in
Trump’s victory speech: “We will get along with all other nations willing to get along with
us… We will  seek common ground,  not  hostility;  partnership,  not  conflict”  (Granma,
2016).  At the same time,  the Cuban government also announced the beginning of  its
annual national  defense exercises.  Weeks later,  on January 2,  2017,  Cuba marked the
anniversary of the triumph of the revolution with a massive military parade, which was
not something normally part of the celebration (Reuters Staff, 2017a). The message to
Washington  was  clear:  Havana  was  ready  to  continue  the  diplomatic  dialogue  but
prepared to defend itself if necessary.
 
In Search of a Policy
17  The early months of the Trump administration were marked by an unusual degree of
chaos  in  the  foreign  policy  process.  The  State  Department’s  role  appeared  greatly
diminished. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson stayed largely in the shadows, left out of key
meetings with foreign leaders, while the White House proposed to cut the department’s
budget by a whopping 37 percent, later reduced to 28 percent (Toosi N. and B. Everett,
2017; Morello C. and A. Gearan, 2017). The department’s entire senior management team
was dismissed within weeks of inauguration, but four months into Trump’s presidency,
he had nominated only one of the department’s other 42 senior executives (Labott E.,
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2017). Appointments at the Departments of Defense and Homeland Security lagged as
well, stalled by White House attempts to impose Trump loyalists on the newly appointed
secretaries  (De  Luce  D.  and  J.  Hudson,  2017).  Meanwhile,  the  president  repeatedly
contradicted policy statements by senior members of his foreign policy team, leaving his
cabinet secretaries to explain away the inconsistencies as best they could (Parker A., 2017;
Nakamura D. and K. DeYoung, 2017). 
18  The National Security Council was roiled by the abrupt departure of National Security
Advisor Michael T. Flynn after just 24 days on the job and the replacement of most of
Flynn’s staff by his successor, Lt. Gen. H. R. McMaster. Shortly after Flynn’s dismissal, Lt.
Col. Craig E. Deare (ret.), NSC office director for Western Hemisphere affairs, provided a
candid look behind the curtain of the administration’s chaotic foreign policy process.
According to Deare, White House advisors Steve Bannon and Jared Kushner were making
policy  decisions  on  the  fly  without  consulting  the  NSC.  Within  days  of  making  the
comments  at  an  off-the-record  briefing,  Deare  was  fired  (Johnson  E.,  2017).  He  was
replaced by CIA operative Juan Cruz, a veteran of the clandestine service (Adams D. and E.
Acevedo, 2017).
19  The  lines  of  authority  regarding  Cuba  policy  were  even  more  uncertain  because
President Trump assigned responsibility for negotiating with Havana to Jason Greenblatt,
an  attorney  for  the  Trump  Organization  who  was  named  the  president’s  Special
Representative for International Negotiations. It was unclear when Greenblatt might get
around to Cuba since his main responsibility was to negotiate peace in the Middle East
(Labott E. and T. Schleifer, 2016). 
20  The new administration’s first  step on Cuba was to launch a “full  review” of  policy
(Reuters Staff, 2017a). Pending its outcome, the administration suspended all the bilateral
talks except for those related to migration, which were mandated by the 1994 U.S.-Cuban
migration accord. Although the White House had originally hoped to announce its new
Cuba policy on May 20 (Cuban Independence Day), the review was not completed in time
because  of  disagreements  within  the  administration  over  what  elements  of  Obama’s
policy to change (Gámez Torres N. 2017; Hirschfeld Davis J. 2017).
21  When an inter-agency group convened in early May to assess the results of the policy
review and make recommendations to the president, virtually every agency reported that
the policy of engagement was working well in their area of responsibility and ought to be
continued. The White House rejected that consensus. Faced with unrelenting pressure
from Cuban American hardliners on Capitol Hill, who kept reminding the administration
that the president had promised during the campaign to roll back Obama’s policy, the
White House took control of the process away from the bureaucracy. The struggle, one
administration official  said succinctly,  was between “policy and politics” (Zanona M.,
2017). 
22  Trump believed he owed a special debt to the Brigade 2506 veterans association — the
veterans  of  the  exile  force  that  stormed  ashore  at  the  Bay  of  Pigs  in  1961—which
endorsed him for president at a time when the race in Florida looked close (Mazzei P.
2016a).  The  president  tasked  two  of  the  most  strident  critics  of  Obama’s  policy,
Congressman Mario Díaz-Balart (R-Fla.) and Senator Marco Rubio (R-Fla.), with drafting a
new policy for him. Rubio even tweeted a picture of them in Rubio’s office captioned,
“Picture of the night @MarioDB and I hammered out the new Cuba policy” (Kroll A.,
2017). But strong counter-pressure came from the business community, which hoped to
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profit from the newly opened Cuban market. Bolstered by that support, the bureaucracy
fought  back  successfully  against  proposals  to  reverse  most  of  Obama’s  policies  and
produced a final package far less severe than Díaz-Balart and Rubio proposed.
 
Paying A Debt to Miami
23  “America will expose the crimes of the Castro regime and stand with the Cuban people in
their struggle for freedom,” Trump (2017) declared before a raucous crowd of Cuban
exiles  at  Miami’s  Manuel  Artime Theater,  named for  the  leader  of  Brigade  2506.  He
acknowledged that he had come to Miami to pay off a political debt. “You went out and
you voted. And here I am like I promised,” he told the crowd. “Effective immediately, I am
canceling the last administration's completely one-sided deal with Cuba. I am announcing
today a new policy, just as I promised during the campaign.”
24  Trump  proceeded  to  denounce  the  Cuban  regime  as  brutal,  criminal,  depraved,
oppressive, and murderous. Listening to his combative rhetoric, one might have thought
that the full panoply of U.S. economic and diplomatic sanctions was being reimposed on
Cuba.  Not so.  Trump’s diatribe disguised the limited scope of  his new sanctions.  The
National  Security  Presidential  Memorandum  (2017)  he  signed  on  stage  in  Miami
tightened the embargo against Cuba in several areas, but left the basic architecture of
Obama’s opening to Cuba in place. 
25  The new regulations limited the “people-to-people” sub-category of educational travel
by  restoring  the  requirement  that  visitors  travel  in  groups  with  a  licensed  travel
provider. No more self-guided tours. (But visitors could still bring back rum and cigars).
U.S. companies and travelers would be prohibited from doing business with enterprises
linked  to  the  Cuban  military,  with  the  exception  of  enterprises  that  run  the  ports,
airports, and telecommunications. Those exceptions were important because they let U.S.
cruise lines, airlines, and tech companies off the hook. The presidential memorandum
also exempted existing contracts so as not to “disrupt” on going business. Finally, the
new regulations expanded the number of Cubans regarded as government officials who
cannot receive remittances from relatives in the United States. Trump’s sanctions were
likely to pinch the Cuban economy, but fell far short of what it would take to do serious
harm.
26  Trump did not roll back Obama’s other regulatory reforms expanding travel and business
opportunities,  or impose any other restrictions on Cuban American family travel and
remittances.  He  did  not  break  diplomatic  relations  or  put  Cuba  back  on  the  State
Department’s terrorism list. He did not restore the wet foot/dry foot policy that gave
Cuban immigrants preferential treatment. He did not abrogate the bilateral agreements
on issues of mutual interest negotiated by the Obama administration, and he did not close
the door to future negotiations—though given the hostile tenor of his speech, it remained
to be seen whether further agreements would be possible. 
27  Further evidence of the limited character of Trump’s policy reversal came in July when,
like his  three predecessors,  he continued to waive implementation of  Title III  of  the
Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996. Title III would allow U.S. nationals
to file suit in U.S. courts against anyone “trafficking” in their confiscated property in
Cuba—that is,  anyone assuming an equity stake in it or profiting from it.  Had Trump
allowed Title III to go fully into effect, as Díaz-Balart advocated, it would have opened the
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door to as many as 200,000 law suits by U.S. nationals whose property was taken by the
Cuban government after 1959. U.S. courts would have been swamped and the ability of
U.S. companies to do business on the island would have been crippled for years to come. 
28  Cuba’s  official  response  was  pragmatic  but  firm.  A statement  released shortly  after
Trump’s Miami speech declared, “The Government of Cuba reiterates its willingness to
continue respectful dialogue and cooperation on issues of mutual interest, as well as the
negotiation of pending bilateral issues with the United States Government… But it should
not  be  expected  that  Cuba  will  make  concessions  inherent  to  its  sovereignty  and
independence, nor will it accept any kind of conditionality” (Government of Cuba, 2017).
29  Why did Trump, despite his obvious sympathy for the most recalcitrant Cuban American
hardliners,  settle  on  such  a  limited  policy?  The  answer  is  that  Obama’s  strategy  of
creating constituencies in favor of engagement succeeded. Public opinion, elite and mass,
supported engagement  by wide margins,  as  did a  majority  of  Cuban Americans.  The
business community and its allies in Congress — many of them Republicans—were solidly
opposed to sanctions that would close off the Cuban market. Even the federal executive
bureaucracy  was  won  over  by  the  diplomatic  successes  scored  by  the  policy  of
engagement.  Asked  why  Trump  did  not  impose  tougher  sanctions,  a  senior




30  Although Cuba was not a salient issue for any constituency other than Cuban Americans,
the  public  reaction  to  the  December  17,  2014  announcement  was  overwhelmingly
positive. Poll after poll showed that the new Cuba policy was widely popular, even among
Republicans, and favorable opinion grew as the policy unfolded over the next two years. A
CBS-New York Times poll taken right after the December announcement found that 54%
of the public approved of both reestablishing diplomatic relations and allowing trade
with Cuba, while only 28% disapproved (Dutton S. et al., 2014). A CNN poll found 63% in
favor of diplomatic relations and 55% in favor of ending the embargo (Diamond J., 2014).
A Washington Post-ABC News poll found 64% in favor of restoring relations and 68% in
favor of lifting the embargo (Clement S., 2014).
31 Six months later, Pew (2015) found support for Obama’s policy had grown, with 73% of
the public in favor of diplomatic relations and 72% in favor of ending the embargo. A
majority of Republicans agreed (56% and 59% in favor respectively),  as did even self-
identified conservative Republicans (52% and 55% in favor). As Obama’s term was coming
to a close in December 2016, support for his Cuba policy remained strong, with 75% in
favor of diplomatic relations and 73% in favor of lifting the embargo. Republican support
had risen to 62%, and conservative Republican support to 57% on both issues (Tyson A.,
2016). 
32 The real political test for the opening to Cuba was how Cuban Americans reacted. For
years, they voted for or against candidates based on their position toward Cuba, and most
Cuban  Americans  favored  a  hardline  policy.  A  major  obstacle  to  policy  change  was
politicians’ fear of the electoral consequences in the swing state of Florida, where Cuban
Americans made up five percent of the electorate and registered Republican by a two to
one margin. Gradually, however, Cuban Americans became advocates for engagement.
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Polling by Florida International University since 1991 has chronicled the evolution of the
Cuban American community in south Florida, as Guillermo Grenier’s article in this issue
describes.  By 2014, before Obama’s announcement, 68 percent of Cuban Americans in
south Florida  favored the reestablishment  of  diplomatic  relations  (Grenier  G.  and H.
Gladwin, 2014). 
33  Shifting attitudes in the community manifested themselves at the ballot box. In 2008,
running on a moderate policy favoring dialogue with Cuba, Obama won 35 percent of the
Cuban American vote, more than any Democrat except Bill Clinton in 1996, who got 35
percent after signing the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (also known as
Helms-Burton), which wrote the embargo into law. In 2012, after loosening restrictions
on travel and remittances, Obama won almost half the Cuban American vote in Florida.
Statewide exit polls showed Obama winning the Cuban American vote, 49% to Romney's
47% (López M. and P. Taylor, 2012) , or losing it narrowly, 48% to Romney's 52% (Bendixen
& Amandi International,  2015).  No Democrat had ever done so well  (Tamayo J.,  2012;
Bendixen S., 2012). 
34  Cuban  American  reactions  to  Obama's  opening  to  Cuba  reflected  the  community’s
changing attitudes. A Bendixen & Amandi International (2015a) poll in March 2015 found
51% in support of normalization and a plurality of 47% in favor of lifting the embargo. By
December,  a  year  after  Obama’s  announcement,  Cuban  Americans  supported
normalization (56% in favor, 36% opposed) and lifting the embargo (53% in favor, 31%
opposed)  (Bendixen  &  Amandi  International,  2015b).  Even  those  living  in  Florida
supported Obama’s policy (52% in favor, 40% opposed). An FIU poll of Cuban Americans in
south Florida conducted in the summer of 2016, after Obama’s March trip to Cuba, found
that support for Obama’s policy of  normalization had grown to 56% and support for
ending the embargo to 54% (Grenier G. and H. Gladwin, 2016).
35  Not surprisingly, Trump’s partial reversal of Obama’s policy was not well received, either
by  the  general  public  or  moderate  Cuban Americans.  A  Morning Consult  (2017)  poll
released on the eve of Trump’s June 16 announcement found that 65 percent of the public
supported  Obama’s  policy  changes  and  only  18  percent  opposed  them.  Republicans
supported Obama’s policy by a margin of 64 percent to 21 percent. Sixty-one percent of
the public and 55 percent of Republicans favored ending the embargo. An online poll of
Floridians by Florida Atlantic University taken shortly after June 16, found pluralities in
support of Trump’s decision to limit travel and business with the Cuban military, but by a
margin of 47 percent to 34 percent, they preferred Obama’s policy of normalization over
Trump’s return to hostility (Leary A., 2017).
36  As details of Trump’s new policy leaked to the press in the days leading up to his speech
in  Miami,  moderate  Cuban  American  groups  spoke  out  in  support  of  engagement.
CubaOne (2017), a group of young Cuban Americans working to reconnect Cubans on the
island with Cubans abroad, sent Trump an open letter imploring him not to return to
“Cold War policies.” The Cuba Study Group (2017a), a moderate pro-business group that
supported Obama’s opening, sent its own letter to Trump, reminding him that a majority
of  Cuban Americans favored normalizing relations with Cuba and urging him not  to
reverse course. After Trump’s announcement, the group criticized the new policy as bad
for the Cuban people and bad for U.S. interests (Cuba Study Group, 2017b). 
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Elite Opinion
37  During the Cold War, Fidel Castro drove successive U.S. presidents crazy by denouncing
U.S. imperialism, aligning with the Soviet Union, and supporting revolutionaries around
the world. But after the Soviet Union collapsed, Cuban troops came home from abroad
and Castro made peace with his Latin American neighbors. The security concerns that
were a driving force behind U.S.  policy evaporated. Yet long after the foreign policy
establishment had concluded that hostility toward Cuba no longer made sense, the old
policy remained in place due to domestic  politics  in Florida.  When President  Obama
finally jettisoned the anachronistic policy of hostility in December 2014, most foreign
policy professionals breathed a sigh of relief and U.S. allies around the world applauded.
38  A bipartisan cross-section of the foreign policy and national security elite supported
Obama’s opening to Cuba on the grounds that the old policy was an ineffective remnant
of the Cold War that was damaging U.S. relations with allies, especially in Latin America.
Polling by the Chicago Council  on Foreign Relations (2004)  found that  foreign policy
“opinion leaders” had been in favor of lifting the embargo on Cuba for over a decade. A
2004 poll found that 80% of opinion leaders favored opening trade with Cuba.
39  In May 2014, 46 luminaries of the policy and business world signed an open letter to
President Obama urging him to adopt a policy of engagement with Cuba. (Support Cuban
Civil  Society,  2014).  The  signatories  included  a  bipartisan  cross-section  of  former
diplomats,  retired  military  officers,  and  Cuban  American  businessmen,  among  them
Ambassador Thomas Pickering, Admiral James Stavridis, sugar magnate Andres Fanjul,
and President George W. Bush’s first director of national intelligence, John Negroponte. 
40  In January 2015, 78 former government officials and opinion leaders, including David
Rockefeller and George Shultz, Ronald Reagan’s Secretary of State, signed a second letter
congratulating Obama on his opening to Cuba, noting that the bipartisan character of the
signatories represented, “the broad support these changes have from across the political
spectrum. We may disagree on a number of issues, but we’ve found common ground for a
simple reason; our fifty-four-year-old approach intended to promote human rights and
democracy in Cuba has failed” (Support Cuban Civil Society, 2015).
41  A few months after Donald Trump’s inauguration, 16 retired senior military officers,
including a former commander of the Southern Command, sent National Security Advisor
McMaster an open letter urging the administration to maintain engagement with Cuba.
“Completing the  reopening of  diplomatic  relations  with Cuba will  provide  long-term
national  security benefits  to the United States,” the officers argued,  citing successful
cooperation  on  counter-terrorism,  border  control,  drug  interdiction,  environmental
protection,  and  emergency  preparedness.  “If  we  fail  to  engage  economically  and
politically,”  they  warned,  “it  is  certain  that  China,  Russia,  and  other  entities  whose
interests are contrary to the United States’ will rush into the vacuum” (American Security
Project, 2017). 
42  It  was unclear how much influence traditional foreign policy elites would have on a
president  who  disdained  Washington  insiders.  Most  Republican  international  affairs
experts  openly  opposed  Trump  during  the  campaign  and  in  August  2016,  50  senior
foreign policy officials from previous Republican administrations released an open letter
declaring their opposition in the sharpest terms (Sanger D.E. and M. Haberman, 2016).
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When President Trump assembled his foreign policy team, he spurned traditional experts
in favor of corporate leaders and military officers. 
43  The prevalence of military officers in top foreign policy and national security posts may
have had a moderating effect on Trump’s Cuba policy. At the Pentagon, the intrusion of
extra-hemispheric powers seeking influence in Latin America was a perennial concern,
with China, Russia, and Iran topping the list—all countries with which Cuba maintained
good relations. For some policymakers, this geostrategic concern translated into support
for  engagement  with  Cuba,  giving  Havana  less  incentive  to  extend  its  economic
relationships with China and Russia into politico-military ones.  K.  T.  McFarland,  who
served briefly as Trump’s deputy national security adviser, summarized the argument
succinctly before she joined the administration: “We must take steps now to ensure that
Cuba doesn’t  become a Russian or Chinese pawn,  and thus serve as  a launch pad to
threaten America’s  security  were  they to  establish a  military  presence”  (Ordoñez F.,
2016).
44  The U.S. Southern Command’s annual Posture Statement detailing security threats and
U.S. capabilities in Latin America has not listed Cuba as a threat (except for concerns
about migration) since the 1990s, but in recent years it consistently warned about the
risks of Russia, China, and Iran gaining influence in the region. The April 2017 statement
was  no  different,  and  three  recent  Posture  Statements  (2013,  2014,  and  2015)  were
prepared by then-commander General John F. Kelly, Trump’s first secretary for Homeland
Security and his second chief of staff.
 
The Business Community
45 The  initial  surge  of  excitement  among  U.S.  businesses  after  December  17,  2014  was
palpable:  finally,  they  had  the  opportunity  to  enter  a  largely  unexploited  market,
forbidden for half  a century.  Over the next two years,  a  parade of  trade delegations
visited Havana,  nine of  them led by sitting governors. New York’s  governor Andrew
Cuomo was the first, taking a group of 20 business leaders in April 2015 (Craig S., 2015).
He was followed by governors representing Gulf states with trade ports (Louisiana, Texas,
and  Mississippi),  and  states  hoping  to  export  agricultural  goods  (Missouri,  Virginia,
Arkansas, Colorado, and Western Virginia). Legislators and local officials led other trade
delegations  from Alabama,  California,  Kentucky,  Illinois,  Indiana,  New Mexico,  North
Carolina, Ohio, and Florida.
46 In March 2015, the U.S. Agriculture Coalition for Cuba—a broad-based group formed after
December 17, 2014 to promote agricultural trade—took 95 people to Cuba, including two
former secretaries of agriculture (Frank M. and D. Trotta, 2015). The U.S. Chamber of
Commerce launched the U.S.-Cuba Business Council representing over two dozen major
corporations,  including  Caterpillar,  Kraft  Heinz,  Sprint,  Boeing,  Home  Depot,  and
American  Airlines.  By  2017,  ports  in  Virginia,  Alabama,  and  Mississippi  had  signed
agreements with Cuba to explore opportunities  for  increasing trade.  Florida ports  at
Tampa Bay, Palm Beach, and the Everglades were forced to withdraw from negotiations
when Governor Rick Scott threatened to cut off state funds to any port doing business
with Cuba (Mazzei P., 2017c).
47 Yet despite the widespread interest in commerce with Cuba, relatively few deals were
completed in the two years after December 2014.  Apart from the sale of  agricultural
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goods, only about four dozen new agreements were signed and some of them, like the
port agreements, were memoranda of understanding that expressed interest in pursuing
future  opportunities  rather  than  firm  contracts.  The  completed  agreements  were
predominantly in the travel and hospitality sectors, which accounted for 25 of the 45
agreements as of early 2017. Telecom was also well represented, with seven agreements
(five with cell phone providers). But in other sectors, no more than one or two companies
had closed deals (U.S.-Cuba Trade and Economic Council, 2017).
48 Even under Obama, progress was stymied by obstacles in both Washington and Havana.
Despite the exceptions to the embargo that Obama licensed in 2015 and 2016, the core of
the economic embargo remained intact. U.S. businesses could not invest on the island or
establish joint ventures with Cuban state enterprises except in telecommunications and
pharmaceuticals.  U.S.  exports  were  still  limited  to  agricultural,  medical,  and  some
consumer goods. Agricultural sales (Cuba’s principal import from the United States) still
required Cuba to pay cash in advance. Just the complexity of the Cuban Assets Control
Regulations and the burden of compliance was enough to deter some businesses from
entering  the  market  for  fear  of  inadvertently  violating  the sanctions  and  incurring
millions of dollars in fines (LeoGrande W., 2016). 
49 Moreover, the 2016 U.S. presidential election created political risk, making businesses
cautious during the final year of the Obama administration. A Republican president could
tighten the embargo once again, and any business that had invested time and money to
build commercial ties with Cuba could find its investment wiped out. Donald Trump’s
election chilled the business climate even more, given his threats on the campaign trail to
reverse Obama’s policy (Robles F., 2016).
50 Nor was Cuba an easy place to do business. Cuba's infrastructure—its roads, energy grid,
and digital network—lagged behind most neighboring countries. Foreign companies still
had  to  hire  labor  through  the  state's  hiring  agency.  Cuba's  bureaucracy  remained
notoriously slow to make decisions and opaque, making dispute resolution problematic.
And Cuba’s  domestic  market  was  relatively  small  since  so  few Cubans  had sufficient
income to purchase imported goods (Cuba Journal, 2016). 
51 Nevertheless, the agricultural, hospitality, and telecom industries lobbied actively and
successfully in defense of the policy of commercial engagement. Over 100 agricultural
businesses and associations signed a letter to President Trump in January 2017, in support
of continuing engagement. “As a broad cross-section of rural America, we urge you not to
take steps to reverse progress made in normalizing relations with Cuba,” they wrote,
“and also solicit your support for the agricultural business sector to expand trade with
Cuba to help American farmers and our associated industries” (Engage Cuba, 2017). In
May, 46 travel companies signed a letter asking Trump not to tighten restrictions on
travel to Cuba (Paul K., 2017). 
52 The U.S. Chamber of Commerce remained committed to ending the embargo as it had
been since the 1990s. After taking eight corporate executives to Cuba in May 2017, Jay
Timmons (2017),  CEO of  the National  Association of  Manufacturers  (NAM),  added his
voice, calling for an end to the embargo. “Expanded economic engagement means new
opportunities for us, and greater prosperity and freedom for Cubans,” he wrote. “It is
time to demonstrate our American values in action.” 
53 The fact that Trump’s cabinet was populated by so many corporate executives meant that
senior officials lent a sympathetic ear to business lobbyists’ calls to expand commerce
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with Cuba in order to increase U.S. exports and create jobs—two of Trump’s top economic
priorities.  The  farm lobby,  for  example,  had  an  ally  in  Agriculture  Secretary  Sonny
Perdue, a long-time supporter of food sales to Cuba who, during his confirmation hearing,
said, “We would love to have Cuba as a customer… We have the product they need and
they would like the product” (Williams J., 2017).
54 Business  reaction to Trump’s  policy announcement was uniformly negative.  The U.S.
Chamber  of  Commerce  (2017)  lamented  the  new  constraints  on  U.S.  business
opportunities. “U.S. private sector engagement can be a positive force for the kind of
change we all wish to see in Cuba,” it said, reacting to the Miami speech. “Unfortunately,
today’s  moves  actually  limit  the  possibility  for  positive  change  on  the  island.”  The
American Farm Bureau, the U.S. Grains Council, the National Corn Growers Association,
the Rice Growers Association, and the U.S. Agricultural Coalition for Cuba all criticized
Trump’s new sanctions. “We need to be opening up markets for American farm goods, not
sending signals that might lead to less access,” said American Farm Bureau President
Zippy Duvall (Murakami K., 2017).
 
Congress
55  As the business community’s interest in commerce with Cuba grew, so did their support
in Congress. The 115th Congress that convened in January 2017 was little-changed from its
predecessor; Democrats gained just two seats in the Senate and seven in the House of
Representatives. Yet despite its Republican majority, the new body included a growing
number of Republican members who supported relaxing the embargo in order to benefit
U.S. businesses. A majority of the 114th Senate had gone on record cosponsoring Senator
Jeff Flake’s bill to abolish the ban on tourist travel, and that majority was intact in the
new Congress.  The  new version  of  Flake’s  bill  was  introduced  in  May  2017  with  55
cosponsors (Reuters Staff, 2017b).
56  A near majority of the 114th House of Representatives supported the sale of agricultural
goods to Cuba on credit, forcing the leadership to broker a compromise that promised to
facilitate increased agricultural sales (Tomson B., 2016). When that compromise fell apart
in the new House,  Rep.  Rick Crawford (R-Ariz.)  vowed to reintroduce his  legislation.
Supporting him was the bipartisan Cuba Working Group, comprising an equal number of
Democrats  and  Republicans  (Zengerle  P.,  2016).  Its  two  Republican  co-chairs,  Rep.
Crawford and Tom Emmer (R-Minn.) both supported Trump during the campaign and
presumably had some political capital with the new administration—but not enough to
prevent the imposition of the new trade restrictions. The congressional Cuba Working
Group blasted Trump’s policy when he announced it.  “We strongly disagree with the
decision to reinstate failed isolationist policies towards Cuba,” it  said in a statement.
“Restricting travel and trade and limiting our ability to export American democracy and
values will hinder, not help, efforts to improve human rights and religious liberties in
Cuba.” Senator Flake rejected Trump’s new travel limits as a step backward and called on
his colleagues to change the law (Merica D., 2017) and Republican Senators John Boozman
of Arkansas and Jerry Moran of Kansas also issued critical statements (Lardner R., 2017)
57  Despite the emergence of bipartisan majorities in favor of commerce and travel,  the
hostility of the Republican leadership in both the House and Senate toward engagement
with  Cuba  meant  that  legislation  to  relax  the  embargo  was  unlikely  to  make  much
headway.  But  neither  was  Congress  likely  to  cooperate  in  tightening  the  embargo.
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President Trump, like Obama before him, would have to craft his Cuba policy relying on
his executive authority. 
 
Conclusion: predictable uncertainty
58  In hammering out his Cuba policy, President Trump faced a political dilemma: how to
fulfill his campaign promise to conservative Cuban Americans that he would gut Obama’s
policy, while at the same time not angering other stakeholders — especially the business
community — who support engagement. To square the circle, Trump announced limited,
ineffective sanctions,  but  then wrapped them in the harshest  Cold War rhetoric  and
marched a parade of Cuban exile heroes across the stage of the Manuel Artime Theater.
As is  his  style,  Trump gave a speech to rouse the base while pursuing a policy that
actually fell  well  short of  his  promises.  In all  likelihood,  political  pressures from the
constituencies  Obama’s  policy  created  will  continue  to  constrain  Trump’s  ability  to
impose sanctions on Cuba. However, his loyalty to the exile right and his embrace of the
policy  of  regime  change  will  make  it  difficult  to  achieve  further  progress  toward
normalizing relations, as the unproductive Bilateral Commission meeting in September
2017 demonstrated.
59  Trump’s new policy will come into clearer focus as the Department of the Treasury and
Department of Commerce promulgate the new regulations governing travel and business,
and  U.S.  and  Cuban  diplomats feel  out  one  another  about  whether  progress  is  still
possible on issues of mutual interest. Trump’s presidential memorandum said little about
state-to-state  relations,  but  did  include  a  single  paragraph  authorizing  continued
engagement with Cuba on topics that serve U.S. interests. The direction of U.S.-Cuban
relations going forward will depend on whether Trump’s performance in Miami was a
one-time reward to his conservative Cuban American audience, or the opening salvo in an
escalating policy of hostility. 
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RÉSUMÉS
Le président Barack Obama a tenté de rendre sa politique d'ouverture à Cuba "irréversible" avant
de quitter le pouvoir. Cet article analyse l'état des relations à la fin de l'administration Obama, ce
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qui  a  été  accompli  et  ce  qui  restait  à  faire,  puis  la transition  vers  la  nouvelle  politique  du
président Trump à partir de ses déclarations de campagne, le débat sur la question cubaine au
sein même de l'administration, ainsi que les premières mesures prises au cours des six premiers
mois de gouvernement. Enfin, nous analyserons les forces politiques qui ont empêché Trump
d'abroger totalement les mesures prises par Obama.
President  Barack Obama intended to  make his  opening to  Cuba "irreversible"  before  he  left
office. This chapter examines the state of relations at the end of the Obama administration; what
was accomplished and what remained to be done. It then describes the transition to President
Donald Trump’s new policy, tracing what he said during the campaign; the debate over Cuba
inside  the  administration;  and  the  initial  policy  steps  taken  in  the  first  six  months  of  the
administration. Finally, it analyzes the political forces that prevented Trump from fully reversing
Obama’s policy. 
El presidente Barack Obama pretendía que su apertura a Cuba fuera "irreversible" antes de dejar
el cargo. Este capítulo examina el estado de las relaciones al final de la administración Obama; Lo
que se logró y lo que quedaba por hacer. Luego describe la transición a la nueva política del
Presidente Donald Trump, siguiendo lo que dijo durante la campaña; El debate sobre Cuba dentro
de la administración; Y las medidas políticas iniciales adoptadas en los primeros seis meses de la
administración.  Finalmente,  analiza  las  fuerzas  políticas  que  impidieron  a  Trump  invertir
completamente la política de Obama.
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